Islamism in The Gambia

The relationship between politics and religion is both dialectical and interactive as each shapes and influences the other. The leaderships of President Dawda Jawara (1970–1994) and Yayah Jammeh (1996–2017) consecutively and separately model how politicians use religion to their own political gain — though, the Jawara regime and Jammeh regime differ. February 18th marks the independence of the smiling coast of Africa, The Gambia. In honour of Gambia Independence Day, I wanted to publish this article that centres on the history of Islamism in this small nation that I also call home. I shed light on how the practice of Islam underwent “perceptible change” between the years 1989 and 2004 (Darboe, 2004). Thus, this article examines the following the discourse: that the relationship between religion and politics are reciprocal.

Now a population of roughly 2.348 million people, The Gambia is a former British colony that gained independence on February 18th 1965. The influence of Islam in Gambian nationalism mirrors Islamism in many other West African countries. It is argued by historians that the influence of the Islamic faith spread to the west coast of Africa around the 12th century, though, initial contact between Islamic and African cultures may date to the medieval period (Nyang, 1998). With the majority of the Gambian population (85% — 90%) being Muslims, it comes as no surprise that the first republic saw the government receiving scholarships from Saudi Arabia to train Gambians to become religious studies teachers in existing schools. Traditionally, most Gambian Muslims had practiced a brand of Islam that accommodates indigenous African customs and beliefs. The result of receiving these scholarships was that most schools in the metropolitan areas of Banjul (the capital city) were speaking fluent Arabic, instructed in Arabic and taught Islamic values that were distinctly different from those in Gambia — all of this had transpired by the late 1970s.

As established, the majority of the population were Muslims, leaving the smaller percentages to be Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Wesleyans, and animists. In fact, the Irish Catholic missionaries were the most numerous and influential non-Muslims. They had a tremendous impact on educational opportunity because they were the sponsor of one of the high schools during this period (Darboe, 2004). In case I haven’t reiterated this properly, the new brand of Islamic values that were introduced courtesy of Saudi Arabia sponsors also differed to the existing Muslim group in Gambia; the Islamic faith includes Hammadiyya and Baha’i denominations. Similarly to the Catholic missions teaching Christian values that differed to Wesleyans and Anglicans, the Hammadiyya perspective differed from that of Baha’i. In addition, the Saudi practice of Islam was welcomed and included as a denomination in the traditional Gambian Muslim practice that included sociologically significant elements of indigenous African influence. Hence, by the 1980s, Gambians were inevitably exposed to competing religious values of various sets, including different versions of Islamic teachings. This Islamist challenge is not unique to Gambia, yet it would be obtuse not to acknowledge that both Islam and Western politics are foreign to African civilisation. Hence, Gambians and other Africans alike had adapted these elements to merge with their own indigenous conditions.

An adequate precursor to evaluating the argument that the perceptible change the practice of Islam in Gambia underwent in a period of 15 years is one that scrutinises how this change manifested radically (Gailey, 1965). This transformation manifested itself from a tolerant and accommodating type of Qadriyya-inspired Islam to a more radicalised form. Thus, this article presents evidence that strengthen the narrative that religion and politics have a reciprocal relationship. This transformation in Islam has been recognised to collide with President Yahya Jammeh’s leadership. Someone who scholars have identified as a “master of manipulation Islamic symbols” (Darboe, 1982). Aware of how salient religion was to success, it became used as a political tool by African leaders; this method dates back to the medieval period (Nyang, 1998). The decolonisation of African countries after World War II revealed more clearly the modernised ways in which leaders would manipulate Islam and Islamic symbols to appeal to the electorate. Albeit in different ways, there is a clear correlation between how Jawara and Jammeh used religion to their political advantage. David Kairaba Jawara was formerly known as Dawda before his political adventures, he was also a Muslim who had converted to Christianity. It wasn’t until he entered national politics in the late 1950s before he re-converted to Islam and became Dawda again. I argue that Jawara should be regarded as an example of how religious faith is linked to success, particularly when we take into consideration that much of Jawara’s political success was due to his reconversion. It was this reconversion that led the Saudi Arabia Kingdom to give scholarships to the Gambian education system during the first republic. This is further entrenched when we consider how this political success was also made possible given that Jawara’s opponent was Pierre Sarr Njie, a Catholic. In a population where the majority are Muslims, of course the public resonated more with the recently re-converted Jawara.

Contrastingly, Yahya Jammeh being branded as the “master of manipulation” when it comes to Islamic symbols has much to do with his public performances of religiosity. Formerly a military soldier, Jammeh exchanged his military uniform for traditional garb, thereby conforming to the proper Islamic dress code. He also manifested symbols of his religiosity by carrying a lengthy string of prayer beads in one hand and a sword in another during his public appearances. Despite both rumour and some evidence indicating that Jammeh was raised a Christian and had shallow knowledge of Islam, it was these outward public displays of piety that increased Jammeh’s approval ratings. Again, this points to the reciprocal relationship between politics and religion. Breaking with his predecessor Sir Dawda Jawara, Jammeh frequently blurred the line between mosque and state to reinforce his political advantage. One example includes him building a mosque on state grounds and cultivating particular imams that would benefit his leadership. Yet at the same time, Jammeh did not hesitate to break with his local Wahhabi allies when he judged it expedient to do so. The Jammeh regime has challenged the nation’s prime of Wahhabi leader over the girls’ wearing of headscarves to schools. This transpired in the wake of severe economic deterioration in Gambia and a resulting rapprochement with the US, something I will delve into more detail later.

It is understandable why success might be linked to religious faith in a society where over 85% of the population are Muslims. Sir Dawda Jawara’s — the first president of independent Gambia — strategies convey how influential religion was in politics. Granted, Jawara’s political success is partially owed to his Muslim brethren but there is no denying the role that his sensitivity to the government’s secular nature played in said success. This in turn proved him to be recognised as an observer of the separation of church and state. This secularism was further demonstrated in the 1970s when the Gambian government’s relations with Libya was severed. The two nations had initially signed an agreement that would help the Gambian government to develop and improve its transportation infrastructure. The agreement would lead to the beginning of Libya beginning to supply luxury buses to Gambia as part of its clause. Here was a beneficial relationship for the Gambian economy as the Gambian government was simultaneously in the process of developing the manufacturing sector of its economy at this time.

Unfortunately, the relationship between the two nations was short lived and was soon broken when the Gambian government announced their plans to start a beverage-producing factory. Since the consumption of alcohol is a violation of Islamic values, the Libyan government threatened to withdraw its assistance if the Gambian government went ahead with the development. Jawara’s decision to terminate all relations with the Libyan government after their ultimatum serves as an example of his sensitivity to the secular nature of the Gambian government. Despite the country being in need of the Libyan government’s assistance, Jawara made it clear that his public policy would not be dictated by a foreign power or any particular religious values. This is in stark contrast to Jammeh’s tactics during his presidential term, where we will see him turn on his Muslim sects in his attempts to impress the United States. Such double-crossing was partially for the betterment of the Gambian economy, but largely for Jammeh’s personal political success.

A call for the transformation of traditional Islamic practice and the emergence of anti-American rhetoric occurred in two parts. In the early 1980s, Libya failed in their efforts to overthrow the then Jawara government. It wasn’t until 1994 before Jawara was deposed in a bloodless coup d’etat by military soldier Yahya Jammeh. Led by Jammeh, the new government was quick to launch a vigorous campaign that would discredit the old Islamic regime. This campaign was not only a distraction from the coup but it was also a justification of the coup. As established, the transformation of Gambia as a secular state to a radically Islamic one was potent. This transformation began with President Jammeh intimidating and discrediting the traditional religious leaders who were loyal to the Jawara regime and its secular approach to governance. Jammeh’s re-inventon of himself as a religious Muslim not only allowed him to become president two years after the deposition of Jawara, but it also allowed him to be in a position where he could discredit traditional religious leaders and everything they had worked towards for the Muslim community.

Now that Jawara was out of office, the next stage in transforming the traditional Islamic practice was alienating the traditional religious leaders. Therefore one of Jammeh’s first actions as president was him summoning all the religious leaders in Gambia, the Iman Ratib of Banjul and the bishop of the Catholic church included, to the state house. Jammeh went as far as chastising, insulting, and humiliating them before the nation by accusing them of being part of and sponsors of the “corrupt old regime”. Not only did these methods alienate the older traditional religious leaders, they also made it necessary for Jammeh to find new allies to consolidate and increase his power. This alienation was paramount to instilling a new practice of Islam and breaking away from a secular society.

The extent to which Jammeh was loyal to the Muslim community is questionable. This leader is someone who was calculated enough to tone down his anti-American rhetoric in an attempt to impress a U.S. government that was engaged in fighting terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists. It also explains why President Jammeh began to distance himself from the Wahhabis and any Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia. Consequently, a government approved campaign of harassment against people of Middle Eastern appearance, as well as those bearing the orthodox Sunni characteristics of long white robes and a long beard began. Another example of how religion was used for Jammeh’s political gain can be illustrated by his decision to reverse the government’s initial threat to close down Christian mission schools. Instead, Jammeh threatened to prosecute and imprison any schoolgirl wearing a veil during his 2003 speech to commemorate the overthrow of the Jawara regime. This is a drastic change from Jammeh’s initial response, which saw his government threaten to close down any mission schools where students were not allowed to wear the veil. The Jammeh regime, which was no doubt characterised by rights abuse and was largely autocratic conveys what an opportunist Jammeh was in the early years of his presidentship.

Despite nobody coming to Sir Dawda Jawara’s rescue the second time he was successfully deposed in 1994, he was still celebrated in Gambia long after he exiled. Jawar is an independence hero having led the country’s liberation from British rule in 1965.

Key Words

The Gambia: not wanting to be confused with their Southern African brothers (Zambia), the article ‘The’ became salient in front of Gambia. When the Portuguese first explored the small country, they named it after the river (aka ‘The River Gambia’). The name was then maintained by the British when they took over.

The Wahhabi Movement/Wahhabism: This is Saudi Arabia’s dominant faith that centres on an austere form of Islam which insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran. On the extreme spectrum, Wahhabis strongly believe that Muslims who don’t practice their domination of Islam are heathens.

Recommended Readings

• Butterworth, Charles E., and I. William Zartman. “Preface. “ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 524 (1992).
• Gailey, H. A. A History of The Gambia. New York: Praeger. Haynes, J. 1998. Religion in Global Politics. (1965)