Sierra Leone: Contextualising the Civil War (1991–2002)

Hello all!

For my first article in my new ‘rebrand’, I wanted to write and share a piece that is personal to me. Here is a quick debrief, I was born in Sierra Leone amidst the civil war, which lasted from March 1991 until January 2002. Like many African conflicts, the impact of this war was triggering and traumatising; many Salone adults who grew up during the war struggle to talk about it/relive it because of the old wounds that are opened. So, with the personal context aside, let’s delve into the historical one. In case the title didn’t hint towards this, today’s article will highlight the causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone and the condition of the country in the pre-colonial and post colonial periods. This article focuses on the cultural, social and institutional causes of the war, with some mentions of the economic, geographical and geopolitical factors. The article should be received as a detailed introduction to (or rather extension of) my next piece on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs for child soldiers.

The civil war in Sierra Leone initially occurred as a result of the armed invasion by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel movement. When discussing the main causes of the war, this conflict opens up a conversation that evaluates the long and complex history of a civil war that was incited by neopatrimonial and greed-and-grievances factors. Coming from and supported by one of the contending factions in (neighbouring) Liberia, RUF rebels were successful in creating a divide between the vulnerable rural areas and thriving cities surrounding the capital (Freetown). The rural region of Sierra Leone was vulnerable to the RUF incursion due to both the human terrain and the physical terrain.

Sierra Leone’s population is divided among several ethnic and social groups. To some extent, this can arguably limit the sense of national identity in the country, thereby producing a human terrain and making it easier for the RUF rebel movement to find recruits. This was undoubtedly the first dividing line between the capital and the rural regions. It is necessary to question the factors that led many Sierra Leoneans in the countryside to voluntarily join the rebel movement. This, to me, stems from the roots of colonialism — yes, even 30 years (at that time) following independence. I say this to say that when the British established a colony in Freetown, Sierra Leone, during the colonial period and focused their presence there in the capital, this called for a different direction in the rest of the country. The “Protectorate” political authority became largely delegated to traditional chiefs in other areas. When you combine the rapid decolonisation process that transpired in 1961, with the national divide, it produces a medicine for unprepared and ill-equipped leaders to run the country.

To contexualise this, different tribes and ethnic groups had lived peacefully together during the pre-independence era. However, this all changed in the post colonial period as politicians began to rely on their own tribes to garner political support as the population grew. This inevitably ignited a new, intensified sense of tribalism. The resentment produced by politicians favouring certain ethnic groups or regions over others played a significant role in destroying the legitimacy of the state and the loyalty of the population towards anything larger than their respective group, region or party.

In short, it was hardly difficult in 1991 for RUF rebels to assemble an armed force that consisted of individuals from the southeastern region in Sierra Leone. Particularly when taking into consideration that this is the very region that felt aggrieved by the policies reinforced by the former President, Joseph Saidu Momoh (1985–1992) of the All People’s Congress Party (APC) which, might I add, was northern backed.

RUF rebels took advantage of this pre-existing tension that had also been caused by poor governance in the country.

Another factor that facilitated and sustained the conflict was the emergence of a disaffected youth population. Sierra Leone’s higher education system had obtained a prestigious reputation both in pre-colonial and post colonial periods. Fourah Bay College (based in Freetown) for example, attracted students from all over the region, had earned itself the nickname “The Athens of West Africa”. And yet, an overwhelming majority of youth in Sierra Leone grew up without education, hence they struggled to find employment.

This begs the question: what does this mean for the RUF when they recruited child soldiers?

The lack of education and economic opportunities played a key role in making recruits available to the different fighting factions. What more, RUF saw an opportunity to exploit the youth of Sierra Leone in addition to playing on the divide between ethnic groups in the country. These recruited child soldiers were promised food, money and an opportunity to study abroad if they served in the war.

Ashby (2002) echoes that the breakdown of family and community systems, coupled with inefficient educational opportunities left many children with limited options for the future.

Discussions on the causes of the civil war conflict should also centre on the poor governance in Sierra Leone. This governance would come to aggravate the very conflict that has affected many children and families in the country. It was a series of incompetent Presidents such as Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh who drove locals to voluntarily join the rebel movement. For example, Stevens’ laissez-faire approach when it came to the development of rural areas can chiefly be digested by the sole fact that the majority of his political clients were located in Freetown. To give you an idea of how delicate and unfair the condition was, only 22% of the population in rural areas had access to clean water. This is alarming given that 80% of Sierra Leone’s population resided in rural areas; certainly a stark contrast to how, of the small number of Sierra Leoneans living in the capital, 83% of them had access to clean water.

Presidents such as Stevens deemed it politically unnecessary to provide rural residents with services that were simply their basic human rights. Such an attitude is an extension of neopatrimonialism.

In the context of this article, neopatrimonialism rests on internal political dynamics of the state and its corrupt dictators. It highlights how their leadership led to a failure in democracy which in turn weakened the state. Historically, Sierra Leone is notorious for the country’s commercially exploitable deposits of minerals such as diamonds, bauxite, rutile and gold. Special mentions should be directed to the country’s well endowed agricultural land and fisheries. However, with government institutions prioritising their focus on providing funds for ministers and employees, they had neglected other departments that would initially enrich the country and benefit the population as a whole. By prioritising the wrong audience, the rich minerals that Sierra Leone was known for had become too accessible and poorly regulated, thus decreasing their value and causing the economy to plummet. William Reno, Kwaku Nuamah and William Zartman asserted that by the 1970s, Sierra Leone had become a “shadow state”, a reckoning that was triggered by poor leadership. Not only did this add fire to the fuel of the war conflict between the 1990s and early 2000s, but it also drove neglected and dissatisfied ethnic groups and regions to support the RUF.

This analysis supports the argument that Sierra Leone was a failed state prior to the civil war. If there is anything to take away from this article, it’s that the war only amplified those factors that had helped to precipitate the war.

When the war ended in 2002, Sierra Leone received a considerable amount of attention from international donors, its former colonial ruler, (the United Kingdom) included. Attempts to politically correct the grave mistakes made throughout the conflict is displayed when nation building efforts (e.g. introducing DDR programs) were made.

When we reflect on the consequences of the conflict, exacerbated by both the government and RUF, this begs the question: what does nation-building look like after a brutal war that violently damaged multiple family structures and disrupted many childhoods?

First, it is necessary to dismantle the patronage that a country like Sierra Leone is built on. Henceforth attempts to indirectly address the roots of the conflict were made by improving governance, regulating the mining industry, strengthening state institutions, providing opportunities to the youth of Sierra Leone and reforming armed forces. With all this in mind, James Dobbins exerts that a decade long of nation-building after the war (2002–2012) was unsuccessful because progress in Sierra Leone remained “tenuous” for the most part.

Although there were attempts to improve governance, these attempts did not manifest. Even today, patronage and corruption prove hard to eradicate. This is a common theme in some African states as we have seen more recently with the conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria. As long as patronage lives on, Sierra Leone remains economically fragile.

Patronage systems are vulnerable to economic crises because the foundation of such systems are built on a leader/ruling coalition providing privileges to its supporters. Truly, the system should be built on the creation of a political and moral community that can benefit the wider population. As established, this is a vulnerable system especially when it comes to economic crises, therefore, it will collapse when there are no more resources to distribute to political clients. This in turn leads to a large number of the population simply not benefitting from the patronage system, thus they grow to resent the government for not providing with basic public services. With leaders such as Stevens and Momoh, it is unsurprising that the dissatisfied population in rural areas were the first to take up arms with the RUF when the war broke out.

The system backfired on itself when patronage networks began to compete with each other as a consequence of a highly fragmented state that had been created by the very system Sierra Leone was built on. The recurring theme that showed up because of the patronage system is that there was a rising dissent from those who disagreed with it. Hence, violence became an option for the disgruntled population.

It is vital that we understand that the war only compounded the difficulties of a population that was already struggling to make a living before the conflict. Sierra Leone’s patronage system was an important source of grievances and social fragmentation, giving rise to the conflict. Patronage networks are still prevalent in the country, although, at the same time, democratic processes are taking hold. It is clearly a long and complex process as the economic progress of the country today shows how inflation and the country’s current account deficit in spite of an increasing GDP growth. In the ten years since the end of its civil war, Sierra Leone remained at peace and democratization made significant advances, but government effectiveness improved only slightly. However, nation-building in Sierra Leone has required reconstructing a failed state rather than simply stabilizing a post conflict country. This has required a very broadly conceived program of social and institutional reforms. As of 2012, the overall situation in Sierra Leone was peaceful but fragile.

My next article will be a short, yet detailed piece that focuses on child soldiers who served in the Sierra Leone civil war. This will emphasise on how the RUF used other methods besides propaganda to encourage the youth to ‘volunteer’ as combatants. In fact, it was largely the reality that many young boys and girls were brutalized into submission, drugged and then forced to fight in the frontlines of combat. In essence, it was not unusual for these children to have been abducted into their point of entry to the war and into their role as child soldiers. In analysing the DDR program introduced for child soldiers after the war, I will explore how scholars such as Stephanie Lee Goins ask us to realign the role that forgiveness plays in such an integration and reintegration of former child soldiers into society.

Key Words

I understand that there were a few word jargons in this piece, so I’ve included the definitions of some of them below. Please note that these definitions are largely specific to the context of this article:

Patronage: Other wise known as a ‘spoils system’, patronage centres around political parties rewarding their patrons/supporters with civil service jobs (especially after winning an election). As highlighted in this article, patronage systems are vulnerable to economic crises, because the foundation of such systems are built on a leader/ruling coalition providing privileges to its supporters.

Neopatrimonialism: A system of social hierarchy. In the context of this article, this rests on internal political dynamics of the state and its corrupt dictators. It highlights how their leadership led to a failure in democracy which in turn weakened the state. This is intricately linked to patronage/patronage systems.

Protectorate: A state that is controlled and protected by another.

Recommended Readings

• Reno, William. Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
• Nuamah, Kwaku and Zartman, William. Case Study: Intervention in Sierra Leone, case study prepared for the conference on Intervention in Internal Conflict, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland, December 7, 2001 (Thomson, 2007)
• Stichick Betancourt, Theresa, Ivanova Borisova, Ivelina et.al. Sierra Leone’s Former Child Soldiers: A Follow-Up Study of Psychosocial Adjustment and Community Reintegration (2010)